Reasons for the Defeat of the Germans

Reasons for the Defeat of the GermansReasons for the Defeat of the Germans and the Results of supremacy17 January 1945Entry of the Soviets in Warsaw13 FebruaryDestruction of Dresden25 AprilMeeting of the Soviet an US forces2whitethornStorming of the Reichstag, end of the Battle of Berlin8 MayGerman vapid surrenderTook an unexpectedly long time- it was obvious by late 1944 and victory seemed imminent with the Germans retreating on all fronts. The victory was slow d have got due to the insistence on an unconditional surrender (no armistice) by the affiliate and Stalin feared his allies would make a separate wild pansy so the unconditional surrender was factorly to reassure him.Stalin wanted to win the race for Berlin originally the Americans.Pushed west at maximum pace liberating Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and Vienna.Continuous complete upright frontal assaults, regardless of casualty counts.confederative Supreme Commander commonplace Eisenhower allowed the Soviets to win to mi nimise casualties and clashes with the USSR.March 27th, 1934 slow the advance order.By primordial 1945 the German fight stew was badly weakened by the kitty bombings of cities such as Dresden which where industrial hubs. The cherry array reached the turn upskirts of Berlin and met the USA at Torgau on the Elbe.Final battle of Berlin.General Zhukov used tactics that caused rattling towering losses.For Stalin, the defeat was as much legions as political.He wished to control as much of Central Europe and Ger numerous providing a wing z unity against any future threatsThe symbol of victory was the storming of the Reichstag on second May 1945.Reasons for the Defeat of the GermansSoviet StrengthThe USSRs geographical size do it effectively impossible for a knock-out blow.German forces constantly faced the problems of beingness dangerous everywherestretched and the lines of communication.The size allowed new armies and industrial bases to be built beyond reach.Population (171 ,000,000 in 1941) nearly three times Germanys (Hitler did have the annexed populations too), the USSR could cave in men in a way impossible for the Germans.Vast infixed resources (oil)m the longer the war went on the stronger the Soviet military-industrial power became, outproducing the Germans in everything by 1943.Command Economy established before the war, well-suited to total war and the emergency brake mobilisation of workers and resources.Leadership, subsequently a bad start the USSR became ruthlessly effective, Stalin was a very cap up to(p) war leader and his generals became highly competent, Propaganda and patriotism make the armed forces and civilians to fight and endure.German weaknessesFailure of the rapid initial victory.celestial latitude 1941, two front war.Germany lacked self-sufficiency, by 1943 to 1944 war outturn depended on all-out exploitation of dwindling sparing and human resources.Hitler made strategic mis bucks expelling best generals in favour of y es men.Abolished the War ministry replacing it with a high council he headed installing von Brauchitsch and Keitel to replace Fritsch.No winter coats.Germans alienated the nationalities arouse resistance and partisans.Allied Contri notwithstandingionDangerous threat to Hitler on early(a) fronts (two front war)Mass bombing campaigns by British and Americans from 1943 caused huge impose on _or_ oppress to German fabrication weakening the resources available to fight on the easterly Front.Allied secret intelligence gained via code breaking undermined German effort at crucial times (Stalin never informed directly)Enormous amounts of military and economic assist.Results of victory for the USSREmerges at the new world superpower, galvanised the USSR and unleashed its huge economic potential. The war badly weakened other European powers and made the USSR prevalent militarily. Germany as the main enemy was occupied, economically destroyed and likely to be demilitarised.For the regime, it was the glow of victory that vindicated the communist ideology, offering a lane to socialism as a replacement for fascism and an alternative system for capitalism. big territorial expansion incorporating the Baltic states and parts of East Prussia.They also took over many East Central European countries that were weak and established pro-Soviet regimes.Also, caused one of the largest migrations in history 12,000,000 refugees, broadly speaking ethnic Germans fled between 1944-1945 as the Red Army advanced.Despite the extent of the victory fears and insecurity remained.Stalin was anxious to the highest degree the economic power of the USA.Feared a resurgent Germany (he wanted to break in into 300 independent states and make them farmland to supply food to Moscow)Feared and distrusted his own people and repressed any who returned including soldiers and prisoners of war.Disagreements on the Four-Power Occupation of Berlin, even after the moment of victory it was obvious an overal l peace would be difficult.Germany haggard into 4 occupation zones (Soviet, French, American, British).Berlin was entirely within the Soviet Zone nevertheless was divided into 4 zones ruled by a Joint Allied Control Commission.Led to recurrent disputes between the USSR and the West.BUT AT A MASIVE PRICEPost-war ReconstructionThe industry was devastated, not least in part due to the war claiming 1/8of the population and causing massive dislocation. Stalin promised in 1945 that the USSR would be get into the leading industrial power by 1960.Gosplan was instructed to prepare the quaternary Five Year Plan for economic recovery.Set ambitious targets for industry (85%) and agriculture.1/3 expenditure to be spent on the Ukraine which had been mostly devastated by the war.Very important for industry and agriculture.Stalin set out to give-up the ghost pre-war levels by three times to recovery, causing an upswing in the parsimoniousness allowing for circumscribe to be abolished and for consumer goods to be producedIndustryMuch of the industry needed to be switched away from military and back to the civilian economy. Industry struggled to adjust to peace in 1946Mining down over 50% 1940Electricity production down 48%Steel down 55%Transport wide disrupted.Workforce diminished, exhausted.Problems intensified by the sudden ending of Foreign aid (Lend Lease) 08/1945.Despite the difficulties by 1950 thither was considerable industrial recovery194019451950 sear (Tons)165.9149.3261.1Oil (Tons)31.119.337.9Steel (Tons)18.312.327.3Cement (Tons)5.71.310.1Electricity (Kilowatts)48.343.291.2The Soviets demanded the fulfilment of full war reparations from enemy countries, even those who had pro-Soviet governments. Huge amounts of material and equipment travelled East (mostly micro chip metal) from occupied Germany. Sometimes entire factories and workers were moved to Russia, the effect of this is probably humble however.Under the 4th five- family plan recovery was impressiveSt eady plus in consumer goods.Rebuilding of the heavy industry.Some steady living ensample growth.By 1948 wages reached 1938 levels.AgricultureDEVASTATEDGosplan figures of lossesKolkhoz 98,000Tractors 137,000Combine Harvesters 49,000Horses 7,000,000 (meat and war)Cattle 17,000,000Pigs 20,000,000Sheep 27,000,000 nutriment -60% 1940 levels.Poor prospects hindered bySever labour shortage as many peasants were the body of the army (27,000,000 people dead overall does not take in those injured)Scorched earth policy hurts the Ukrainian bread basket. exclusively 75% land cultivated in 1940 was cultivated in 1945.1946 driest year since 1891, and the HARVEST WAS POOR ONTOP OF THISLed to some regions experiencing famineFamine of 1946-1947 began in Ukraine and Central Russia (Stalins most hated areas) physical aspect not helped by dislocation caused by the war, especially shortage of labourers and lack of machinery. Nothing on the stage of the Great Famine Khrushchev claimed that in both Stali n exported grain overseas rather than relieving the famine.Letter to local Politburo representative on the management of a collective farm in Western Siberia September 1948 adapted by NoahWhy should we give you everything and not receive a gram back, undermining the economy of collective farms. We realise that during the war the grain was needed to supply the army and we gladly gave up everything. We had poor harvests in 45, 46, 47 only if we gave everything for the recovery. How come in 1948 we cant keep some? We hoped that after achieving quota we could give out one kilo per work day, with these collections taking more than the quota we have nothing, there is not enough seed to sow for 1949, we dont see a buttocks of bread and live off potato.The recoveryWas slow and patchy, the 4-5YP bought some increases but failed to reach targets.By Stalins death the agricultural sector was unsatisfactory but some areas recovered better.However, the famine cycle in Russia was broken 0 famin e since 1947.One major thing holding back recovery was Stalin himselfHis book Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR 1952.The writings were undeniable and this reject innovation and change.After Stalins death, the successors felt they had to introduce reforms and concessions to peasant farmers to alleviate their problems.1940194719481949195019511952 corpuscle (tons)95.665.967.270.281.278.792.2Potatoes (tons)76.174.59589.688.558.769.2Cotton (tons)2.21.72.22.53.53.73.8Cattle (m head)282323.824.224.624.325.0Speech at the Supreme Soviet by Georgii Malenkov, published in Izvestia, 09/07/1953 (post Stalin GM in temporary control), adapted by NoahUntil now Stalins death we have not been able to develop light industry and the food industry at the alike pace as heavy. We are obliged to ensure more rapid improvement in peoples living standards. We must significantly increase the getup of consumer goods and in grain production. We need to melt off compulsory quotas from collective farm s and reduce agricultural taxes.SummaryWar was won at a large cost.But vindicated Stalins role as leader.Post-war reconstruction was more in(predicate) than may have been expected in 1945 amid the ruins.